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ABSTRACT 
Temperature stabilization requires that CO2 emissions be limited to less than 3 Gt Carbon equivalent, from the 
present level of more than 6 Gt. Despite an increase of  primary energy demand by 250% in 2050 we find that a 
nuclear intensive scenario assuming the development of  a 3000 GWe pool of PWR reactors by 2030 and of an 
additional 6000 GWe pool of U-Pu or Th-U reactors by 2050 would lead to temperature stabilization at a level 2 
degrees above the pre-industrial level. 
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1-INTRODUCTION 
The signs of an already present global warming have been summarized and stressed by a recent IPCC1 report. As 
can be seen on Figure1, climatic  models  show that the atmospheric concentration of Carbon Dioxide, and, thus, 
the temperature,  could be stabilized only if  annual anthropic emissions were reduced from the present level of 6 
Gt2 to 3 Gt Carbon equivalent.  The later this reduced emission rate is  reached, the higher the level of CO2 
concentration and, thus, the average world temperature will be. 
  
Figure 1 Examples of anthropogenic CO2  emission patterns(left (b)). The curves are labeled by the asymptotic 
CO2 concentrations. Full  and dashed lines correspond to different patterns leading to the same 
concentrations. The same concentration is obtained if the area below the curves are the same. Crosses refer to 
emissions by our scenario, circles to the IIASA A2 scenario.  The evolutions of the CO2 concentration are 
shown on the right(a).  From ref.2 
By 2050 the world population should lie between 9 and 11 billion, as compared to the present 6 billion. Therefore, 
in order to stabilize the Carbon Dioxide concentration, a reduction of the average per capita emission  by at least a 
factor of 3 has to be achieved. Thus, the present average CO2 per capita emission of 1 ton equivalent Carbon 
should be reduced to 0.3 tons. The actual reduction factor will depend on the emission level of individual 
countries. For example the US emit about 6 tons per capita, 20 times more than the target average! That we are not 
moving in the right direction is demonstrated by the projections of the IIASA-WEC report:  emissions in 2050  
range between 5 Gt in the most “ecological” scenario and 15 Gt in the most “industrial” one. 
Strong steps should be taken as soon as possible to decrease greenhouse gas emissions. Due to the legitimate 
needs of developing countries, energy demand is bound to increase. Significant reductions of the use of fossil 
fuels for  transportation  will be difficult to achieve due to the absence of competitive alternatives to combustion 
engines at the industrial level. Electricity production amounts to almost 40% of the primary energy supply i, mostly 
                         
i Here, as well as in the whole contribution, electricity is estimated by the amount of oil necessary to produce it 
with an efficiency of 30% (including transport losses). Thus we use the equivalence 1 Twh=0.3 Mtoe 
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obtained from fossil fuels. Examples such as those of France and Sweden show that  this needs not  be the case. 
Using different mixes of hydro and nuclear power, these countries produce their electricity with almost no CO2 
emission. The efficiency of such a policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can be evaluated by comparing  
Denmark and France, two countries with equivalent development levels. For each  TOE of primary energy 
consumed, Denmark releases 3.2 tons of Carbon Dioxide in the atmosphere as compared to 1.6 for France. A 
significant reduction of the contribution of fossil fuels to the production of electricity is, probably, the most 
efficient and easy way to start decreasing CO2 emissions. New renewable energies (wind and solar) are still not 
competitive. Hydroelectric resources are limited in industrialized countries. They are significant in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America but their implementation encounters environmental limits. In addition, they are very capital 
intensive, and this may limit their extension in developing countries. As shown in a recent French study3, nuclear 
power is competitive with fossil fuels for the production of electricity if the complete life cycle ii is considered. 
Usual World energy scenarios only foresee a rather modest contribution of nuclear energy to the future energy 
mix. For example, in its most nuclear intensive scenario, the World Energy Council limits the  contribution of 
nuclear energy in 2050, to 15% iii, from the present 5%. On the other hand, the most “ecologically driven” 
scenarios consider an increase of the contribution of renewable energies from the present 18% (mostly traditional 
use of wood and hydroelectricity) to as much as 37% iv in 2050. This increase is significantly due to the 
development of wind and solar energies whose present contributions are very small. Like nuclear power, these 
energies would contribute to mitigating global warming and the exhaustion of fossil reserves. However, they are 
still much more expensive and capital intensive than nuclear power. Furthermore they require some inexpensive 
and convenient means of storing electricity and this is still not available today. There is no rational base on which 
to exclude exploring  a larger contribution of  nuclear energy than is presently done. This paper  gives a 
preliminary approach to a nuclear intensive scenario.  
We first examine in some detail a possible scenario up to year 2030. Indeed, given the  inertia of energy producing 
systems, it seems that important technological breakthroughs would not have time to be applied at the required 
scale before that year. Our driving motivation is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as much as possible and we 
believe that, for the time being, the only large scale alternative is to replace fossil fuel electric power facilities with 
nuclear ones. However it should be clear that, in our mind, renewable energies could, progressively, replace 
nuclear power as they  become competitive. The important goal is to reduce CO2 emissions, not to increase 
nuclear power! 
We show that the 3Gt emission target cannot be reached as early as 2030, and that further progress is needed. 
Between 2030 and 2050 new technologies may become available on a large scale, especially in  transportation,  
with electric or hydrogen fueled vehicles. Here the new technologies will require additional electricity. For the 
production of electricity, it should be possible to almost completely exclude the use of fossil fuels, and resort 
either to nuclear or to renewable energies. We shall examine the extent to which CO2 emissions could be further 
reduced between 2030 and 2050. Since today already, nuclear power has the capacity to be a major actor in this 
reduction, we shall concentrate on its contribution, stressing once more that its role might be reduced thanks to 
the expansion of renewable energies. We shall examine the possible physical limitations on the  increase of 
nuclear power considered, both in terms of reserves and in terms of the possible development of innovative 
reactors.    
2-PROJECTIONS UP TO 2030 
 
We have used scenario A2 of the IIASA 4 as our reference.  This scenario corresponds to a high growth rate and 
the preferential use of coal. It maximizes  CO2 emissions, but, because of the limited oil and gas reserves it may be 
considered as the most likely scenario in the absence of strong action to curb CO2 emissions. It is close to 
“business as usual”  and assumes market mechanisms. The IIASA scenarios follow the evolutions of economy 
and energy variables in 11 regions. To make things simpler we have grouped  these regions into four aggregates: 
A)OECD, B)Transition Economies(former Soviet countries), C)Developing Asia (China, India, Southeast Asia), 
D)Rest of the world (South America, Africa, Middle East). In the reference scenario the share of nuclear power 
and renewable energies for electricity generation is small. We have considerably increased the nuclear share with 
different amounts depending upon the aggregate. However, we have kept these shares within what we think is 
reasonably achievable by 2030, given the capabilities of the nuclear industry and the technological level of the 
different countries. We have  replaced the reference shares of nuclear power for the production of electricity by: 
                         
ii Because it is capital intensive (a situation similar to that of renewables), and because of delayed capital return, 
nuclear power is at a disadvantage, especially as compared to a gas turbine combined cycle. 
iii Scenario B of the IIASA/WEC Global Energy Perspectives 1998 report.  
iv Scenario C2 of the IIASA/WEC Global Energy Perspectives 1998 report. 
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· 85% rather than 14% for A. The proportion of nuclear power has been chosen so that the share of fossil fuels 
in the production of electricity becomes marginal.  
· 50% rather 6% for B. This relatively high value is justified by the high technical level of countries in 
transition. 
· 30% rather than 3% for C.  China and India already have strong nuclear capabilities. 
· 30% rather than 0.1% for D. The D aggregate has a very inhomogeneous structure with countries like South 
Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Chile which could achieve high levels of nuclearization and most of 
Africa which should remain weakly nuclearized. The Middle East could reach a  significant level of 
nuclearization. 
We have not modified the contribution of renewable energies, which reaches 18% of electricity production. 
Should they gain in competitivity, their contribution could partially replace nuclear power. Table 1 compares the 
structure of energy production and  CO2 emissions in the reference and nuclear intensive scenarios. 
It appears that, assuming  3000 additional reactors are built, as compared to the reference scenario, CO2 emissions 
would be reduced by 27%, for a contribution of  nuclear power to electricity production of 61%.  
Although significant, this result is insufficient. As stated above, temperature stabilization would require CO2 
emissions below  3 Gt Carbon equivalent, 4 times less than in the reference scenario, 3 times less than in the 
present modified scenario.  
On line 18 of Table 1 we show  CO2 emissions in the OECD. It is interesting to see that, in the nuclear intensive 
scenario, the emissions in 2030 are reduced to 1650 tons from the 3150 tons of 2000. This means that fulfilling  the 
Kyoto objectives would be easy in such a scenario. 
3-EXTRAPOLATIONS TO 2050 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
IIASA(A2) IIASA(A2) Nuclear intensive IIASA(A2) Nuclear intensive Hydrogen IIASA(C2)
1 Year 2000 2030 2030 2050 2050 2050 2050
2 Population(Millions) 6168 8751 8751 10056 10056 10056 10056
3 GDP(G$) 27436 61597 61597 101519 101519 101519 75050
4 GDP/Capita k$ 4,4 7 7 10,1 10,1 10,1 7
5 Primary Energy(Mtoe) 10710 18408 18408 24840 24840 24840 14250
6 Primary Electricity(Mtoe) 4107 8060 8021 10231 10231 20154 6524
7 Nuclear(Mtoe) 493 684 4902 1092 7034 16047 2163
8 Fossil elec. 3008 5894 1638 6409 467 1378 952
9 Nuclear+renewables 1099 2165 6383 3822 9764 18776 5573
10 % Electricity 38,35 43,78 43,78 41,19 41,19 81,14 45,79
11 Nuclear %El. 12 8,49 61,12 10,68 68,75 79,62 33,15
12 Renewable% El. 14,75 18,38 18,38 26,68 26,68 13,54 52,26
13 Fossil elec.% 73,25 73,13 20,42 62,64 4,57 6,84 14,58
14 Nuclear(Gwe) 275 376 3387 607 4466 8915 1202
15 Nuclear(% total) 4,6 3,72 26,63 4,4 28,32 64,6 15,18
16 CO2(Mt C) 6976 11693 8465 16838 12695 5106 5114
17 Saved CO2 % 27,61 24,61 69,68 69,63
18 CO2(Mt C)OECD 3146 3973 1648 4266 2040 746
19  Unat tons/year 31690 43983 315142 62414 401957 916951 115360
20 Cumulative tons U nat 1,39E+06 4,10E+06 2,45E+06 1,13E+07 1,64E+07 4,31E+06
World total
TABLE 1  
 
After 2030 further reductions should take place, such as: 
· Phasing out of fossil fuel use for electricity production in favor of nuclear or renewable energies.  
· Increase of the share of electricity in the energy mix: phasing out of fossil fuel use for home heating, increase 
of the share of electric public transportation, electric cars, hydrogen  fuel cells etc.  
A first nuclear intensive scenario, in 2050, is shown in column 6 of Table 1. It is a simple extrapolation of the 
nuclear intensive scenario in 2030 shown  in column 4. The high share of nuclear power in electricity production is 
generalized to all aggregates, with: 
· 80% nuclear and 15% renewables for A. 
· 80% nuclear and 17% renewables for B. 
· 60% nuclear and 36% renewables for C. 
· 40% nuclear and 53% renewables for D. 
The share of electricity represents 41% of the primary energy. Although  CO2 emissions are reduced significantly 
from 16 Gt to 12 Gt, this reduction is not large enough to even come near the 3 Gt goal. The relatively high share 
of renewables (27%) had already gone part of the way in reducing  CO2 emissions. Any further reduction of 
emissions requires a strong reduction of fossil fuels in the transportation and home heating sectors. We have 
 4
assumed that, in the most developed countries, hydrogen fuel cells would be used extensively for private cars 
and the co-generation of heat and electricity. High temperature  reactors would allow increased thermodynamic 
efficiencies as well as co-generation. These gains in efficiency are assumed to counterbalance the limited 
efficiency of hydrogen production, so that we have kept the total primary energy needs unchanged. The shares 
of electricity in the aggregates are as follows: 
· 90% for A. 
· 85% for B. 
· 80% for C. 
· 70% for D. 
We find that, under these conditions,  CO2 emissions are reduced below the year 2000 value, while the primary 
energy demand is multiplied by more than 3. With further electrification, a reduction of  CO2 emissions below 3 Gt 
before 2070 becomes feasible. With these conditions, the CO2 concentration could be limited to 450 ppmv (i.e. 
twice the pre-industrial level) as seen on Figure 1 where the crosses correspond to the emissions of the nuclear 
intensive scenario in 2030 and to the hydrogen scenario in 2050. This concentration corresponds to a temperature 
increase of approximately 2° C in 2100.   
The main characteristics of  the scenario minimizing CO2 emissions are displayed on Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 Least CO2 emission scenario: Primary Energy, total electricity and nuclear production (left scale 
MToe). The CO2 emission in MT(C) is also shown (right scale) 
The results of  scenario C2 of the IIASA are shown for comparison in column 8 of Table 1. This scenario is the 
most efficient of the 6 IIASA scenarios in minimizing CO2 emissions. It is characterized by  
· a modest GDP, 25% smaller than the A2 one 
· a very low energy intensity such that the primary energy needs are 42% less than those of A2 
· a less than 15% contribution of fossil fuels to electricity production. This is obtained by  high shares of 
renewables (52%) and nuclear power (33%). Thus the philosophy of this scenario has a strong similarity with 
our “nuclear intensive scenarios” in minimizing the contribution of fossil fuels to electricity production. As 
we have already stressed, the relative shares of nuclear and renewables are not essential and should be 
determined by their relative competitivity.  
Should the two strategies of lowering the primary energy demand and increasing the share of electricity be 
compatible, the 3 Gt goal might be achieved as soon as 2050.   
4-REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM. 
 
The annual nuclear power production in the different scenarios is shown on line 7 of Table 1. The 2030 nuclear 
intensive scenario produces 4902 MTOE, while the 2050 hydrogen scenario produces 16047 MTOE. The nominal 
nuclear power needed for these productions depends upon the mean to peak  power ratio. This  ratio usually 
decreases with the share of nuclear power, which is more efficiently used in the base regime. For this reason we 
have used mean to peak ratios varying between 0.6 and 0.8. In the hydrogen scenario, reactors can be used to 
produce hydrogen  outside peak demand periods, so that mean to peak ratios are improved. Note that this would 
hold for renewable energies as well. With these considerations the installed nuclear power need would be 3387 
and 8915 GWe in the nuclear intensive 2030 and hydrogen 2050 scenarios. The average number of diverging 
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reactors would be around 150 annually in the period between 2010 and 2030 and would increase to approximately 
300 annually between 2030 and 2050.  
4-1-Natural Uranium Availability 
 
If carried out with PWR or BWR reactors, the important nuclear power deployment will make heavy demands on 
natural Uranium resources.  Resources are, presently, estimated to be around 20 Million tons.  Assuming PWR or 
BWR reactors, the cumulative needs in 2050 could reach 16 million tons. This shows that breeding reactors are 
necessary to meet the needs or, alternately, that Uranium would have to be extracted from sea water, at a 
significant cost.  
 
4-2-Breeding Scheme 
 
We consider  two possible breeding cycles: 
· The U-Pu cycle using fast reactors 
· The Th-U cycle using thermal reactors 
In both cases the initial  loads are assumed to be mixtures of the fertile element (U or Th) with Plutonium taken 
from the used fuels of PWR and BWR reactors. It is important to make sure that the amounts of Plutonium 
available would be sufficient to supply all the breeding reactors by 2050. 
4-2-1The U-Pu Cycle. 
Experience with fast breeders shows that a typical5 1.2 GWe reactor requires an initial inventory of 5 tons of 
Plutonium. A 1200 MWe reactor produces around 0.25 tons of Plutonium annually, corresponding to a doubling 
time of 20 years. However this value of the doubling time does not take into account the reprocessing stage. The 
longer the cooling time of the used fuel before reprocessing, the longer the effective doubling time. As an 
example, if the residence time of the Plutonium in the reactor is 4 years, and the cooling time also 4 years, the 
Plutonium inventory is doubled, as well as the doubling time. We study the transition between a PWR(BWR) 
based system to a fast reactor one. We assume that a strong PWR program starts in 2010, first breeders  starting 
progressively in 2020. By 2030 no new PWRs diverge, leaving the field to fast reactors. Figure 3 shows the 
evolution of the reactor pool corresponding to a Plutonium production of 250 kg/GWe by the PWRs and 200 
kg/GWe by the fast breeders.  We assumed a cooling time of 1 year. The target of 9000 GWe by 2050 can be 
reached. For longer cooling times it is found that the target cannot be reached. Cooling times as short as 1 year 
are probably not possible with standard aqueous reprocessing and would require pyro-chemical reprocessing. 
After 2050 the PWRs would  be phased out progressively and the doubling time of the FR could be adjusted to 
the desirable evolution of the reactor pool. In the Figure we assumed a 1.5% annual increase of the nuclear pool.  
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Figure 3: Number of GWe, for the U-Pu cycle, as a function of time 
 6
Figure 4 shows  the  Plutonium stockpile outside the reactors. It displays three regimes: first the Pu inventory 
increases slowly until 2030 as a result of the production by the increasing PWR(BWR) pool. The decrease 
between 2030 and 2050 reflects the sharp increase in the number of  fast reactors. The  increase after 2050 is due 
to the slower increase of the number of fast reactors. Instead of keeping the total plutonium stockpile at such a 
high value, it could be possible to use the excess neutrons for the transmutation of fission fragments, for example. 
Alternately reactor sizes could be decreased, giving more flexibility to the power system. 
In our scenario the last PWR reactors will be phased out in 2070. At that time the total amount of  used natural 
Uranium would reach 12 million tons, close to the presently estimated reserves. This means that the number and 
life time of the PWR pool cannot be considered as an easily adjustable variable to achieve the strong increase of 
nuclear power between 2030 and 2050. This increase will be difficult  to achieve and requires the early 
development of breeders, as well as the availability of as much as possible reprocessed Plutonium.  The 
generalization of MOx incineration has to be weighed against this requirement. Similarly incinerating  Plutonium in 
HTR reactors may be counterproductive if used fuel reprocessing is not possible. Until the development of 
breeder reactors the best use of reprocessing facilities might be the fabrication of Pu-Thorium fuels for PWRs, 
producing 233U, which could be used as described in 4-2-2.   
Of course, accepting a lower value for the target in 2050 would make things easier. For example a target of 7000 
GWe could be obtained with a doubling time of 32.5 years. Another  possibility would be to increase the share of 
more efficient Plutonium producing reactors such as the CANDUs.  
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Figure 4: Evolution of the Pu inventory 
4-2-2 The Th-U cycle 
The possibility of breeding 233U from Thorium was demonstrated by the MSRE6 experiment. The MSBR7 project 
has produced a rather detailed design for a large Molten Salt Reactor, with interesting breeding possibilities. As 
an alternative to the solid fuel U-Pu breeders we have studied the potential of  the U-Th cycle with MSR reactors. 
The first fissile loads of the 1 GWe MSR are made of  industrial Plutonium obtained from used PWR fuel 
reprocessing. Due to the mediocre neutronic properties of this Plutonium, our simulations show that 4 tons/GWe 
are needed to insure criticalityv. The initial Plutonium load is replaced by 233U. Every year, all 5 years old available 
Plutonium is used for new MSRs. This is not sufficient to insure the required rate of increase. The complement is 
obtained from the excess 233U produced in the operating MSRs, used to start new Th-U3 reactors.  Only 1 
ton/GWe of 233U is needed to insure criticality of a MSR. The doubling time is 25 years with a 10 day cycling time 
of the salt. The chemical treatment amounts to extracting fission products  and Protactinium. 233U is re-injected 
into the salt after Protactinium decay.  Figure 5, is similar to Figure 3 for the U-Pu cycle, and shows the evolution 
of the reactor  pool. We have distinguished Th-Pu  and Th-U3 reactors according to their initial loads. The life 
time of the reactors was assumed to be 40 years, which explains the decrease of the “Th-Pu” reactors after 2070.  
                         
v The equality between this number and the inventory of the U-Pu breeders is fortuitous 
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Figure 5 Number of GWe for the Th-U cycle as a function of time 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the 233U stockpile outside the reactors. The Plutonium stockpile is not displayed 
since all produced Plutonium is, after 5 years cooling, used for new Th-Pu reactors. Like for the U-Pu cycle, the 
amount of available 233U measures the flexibility of the system which could be used for fission product 
transmutation or(and) use of smaller production units. It is interesting to note that the final stockpile of  233U is 
only 16000 tons, to be compared to the much larger stockpile of 80000 tons of Pu displayed on figure 4. However, 
due to the difference of inventories (1 ton versus 4 tons), the number of new reactors which could  be fed with 
these stockpiles is the same, namely 16000 GWe.    This illustrates the fact that the value of h (2.9 for Pu versus 
2.3 for 233U) is not the only  relevant quantity to evaluate  breeding potentials.      
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Figure 6 Evolution of the U3 stockpile in the Th-U scenario 
4-3 Safety Requirements 
The probability for an important radioactivity release following PWR core melting is currently estimated to be  
around 10-6. With the existing reactor pool such an accident might occur every 3000 years, or, in other words, with 
a probability of 3% in a century. For a 9000 GWe reactor pool, and without safety improvements, this major 
accident might occur every century. This would, clearly, be unacceptable. The EPR is a first step in the right 
direction and may be compatible with the larger pool. Future breeder reactors, too, must have very high safety 
standards. In this respect, high temperature gas reactors, molten salt reactors and Accelerator Driven Sub-critical 
Reactors appear to be promising, especially for limited sizes.   
In order to inforce the necessary high safety standards, it might be desirable to set up a World Nuclear Safety 
Authority in charge of reactor licensing and with the authority to suspend the operation of dangerous facilities.   
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4-4 Reprocessing Needs 
One has to distinguish reprocessing the fuel of the PWR from that of the breeders. The size of the PWR  pool will 
reach 3000 GWe. This will produce, annually, 90000 tons of used fuels to be reprocessed, most probably in 
centralized facilities like those of La Hague and Sellafield.  
Reprocessing is a necessity for the breeders and converters. Most probably, reprocessing will be associated 
locally to the breeders and converters, using pyrochemical techniques.  
It has been proposed not to reprocess high duty ceramic fuels such as those of high temperature gas reactors. In 
absence of reprocessing, after the fuel is burnt up it has to be replaced by a new fuel produced in another type of 
reactor or by enriched Uranium. Thus, breeding from the fertile part is not be possible.  
 
4-5 Waste Production 
Although the considerable increase of the size of the reactor pool will lead to an ample production of fission 
products, the characteristics of the breeding  pool have several interesting consequences: 
· Plutonium  becomes a fuel. It also seems possible that most of the minor actinides will be incinerated. 
· By 2050 about 10 million tons of depleted Uranium will be available. These could provide a 10000 GWe U-Pu 
breeding  pool  with fuel for 1000 years. Alternately, in the case of the Th-U cycle only a modest amount of 
10000 tons of Thorium would be needed annually. 
· Aside from technological wastes, fission products will be produced at an annual rate of 10000 tons. 
4-6 Capital Needs 
Assuming the capital cost of a 1 GWe nuclear facility between 1  and 1.5 billion $,  the cumulative investments 
needed would amount to between 10 and 15 trillion $ in the period 2010-2050. This is to be compared to the 
cumulative investments estimated, in scenario A2, to 18 trillion $ between 2020 and 2050.  
5-CONCLUSION 
Large hydroelectric and nuclear power plants are the only proven, both economically and technologically, 
techniques able to replace fossil fuels in the production of electricity. The development of hydroelectricity is 
limited by severe environmental constraints. Thus, nuclear power is, at present, the only realistic possibility to 
reduce CO2 emissions while providing more available energy to developing countries. In a probably distant future 
new forms of renewable energies could  concur with nuclear power to curb CO2 emissions. Meanwhile it is wise to 
push the nuclear contribution to its limit. We find that, even for high energy intensity scenarios, intensive use of 
nuclear power could reduce the CO2 emissions to less than 3 Gt C as early as 2070, limiting the temperature rise to 
about 2°C. in 2100.  In the scenario which allows this performance 150 GWe PWR reactors would be built annually 
starting in 2010, the total number of PWRs stabilizing between 2500 and 3000 GWe in 2030. Breeders using either 
the fast U-Pu or the thermal Th-U cycles would develop from 2020 on to reach 6000 GWe in 2050. With such 
deployment, fossil fuels could be excluded from electricity production while the share of electricity in primary 
energy would rise to  more than 80%, from the present 40%. This increase of the share of electricity could be 
obtained by a general use of hydrogen and of heat co-generation.  
In this nuclear intensive scenario a large fraction of presently estimated Natural Uranium reserves will be used. 
The increase of  the breeder pool appears to be the fastest possible and will put strain on the management of 
Plutonium  as well as on the sizes of the reactors. Relaxing the timing conditions, increasing the share of 
renewable energies or decreasing the energy intensity would, of course, alleviate this strain.   
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